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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RODEBUSH: FINDING THE ROAD TO STRICT
LIABILITY FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORTS
OF EMPLOYEES
I. INTRODUCTION
Respondeat superior, commonly known as "imputed negli-
gence' 1 or "vicarious liability,"'2 literally means "let the master an-
swer.",3 Despite its English beginnings,4 the doctrine has been widely
accepted across the United States,5 including Oklahoma.6 In the re-
cent decision of Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd.,7 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court had the opportunity to revisit the doctrine
as it applies to employees' intentional torts. In Rodebush, an em-
ployee's battery upon a third party was held to be within the scope of
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed.
1984).
2. Id.
3. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Ralph L. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Willful Torts of His Servants, 45
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1, 2 n.5 (1968) (citing dicta in the famous English decision of Jones v. Hart, 2
Salk. 441 (K.B. 1698)). In dicta, the Jones decision provided the first judicial recognition of
respondeat superior.
5. WARREN A. SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," in STuDIEs IN AGENCY
249-61 (1949).
6. Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 21 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. 1933).
7. 867 P.2d 1241 (Okla. 1993).
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employment s and incidental to the occupation; 9 thus, the employer
was liable for the tortious conduct.10
In its analysis, the court reiterated prior holdings which recog-
nized that an employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if
it is
"fairly and naturally incident to the business", [sic] and is done
"while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be
done, although mistakenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the
master's interest, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally
grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform the master's
business." 11
Though the court reviewed precedent, it failed to plausibly analyze
the reasonably foreseeable expectations of the employer or the nature
of the employment at issue. By avoiding these issues, the Rodebush
decision extends respondeat superior to more closely resemble strict
liability for an employee's intentionally tortious conduct.
To avoid such a consequence, when examining an employer's lia-
bility for an employee's intentional torts, the court should determine:
1) whether the conduct occurred within the scope of employment;
2) whether the conduct was incidental to the employee's duties;
and
3) whether the conduct was reasonably foreseeable by the em-
ployer within the nature of the employment.
8. Id. at 1246. See also Brayton v. Carter, 163 P.2d 960, 962 (Okla. 1945) (finding that a
seventy-five mile deviation from course of employment could be within the scope of employ-
ment); Russell-Locke Super Serv., Inc. v. Vaughn, 40 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Okla. 1935) (finding that
employee's assault on third party was clearly within the scope of employment, where the em-
ployee battered a third party while attempting to repossess employer's property); Cargo, 21 P.2d
at 1, 7 (finding toll gate keeper was acting within the scope of employment when he fired gun-
shots at passerby who refused to pay toll); cf Tulsa Gen. Drivers Union, Local No. 523 v. Con-
ley, 288 P.2d 750,753 (Okla. 1955) (finding that employee's assault on a third party was outside
the scope of employment even though it occurred during time and place of employment); Hill v.
McQueen, 230 P.2d 483, 486 (Okla. 1951) (finding that employee's assault on a third party at a
social meeting was not within the scope of employment).
9. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1243. See also Patsy Oil & Gas Co. v. Odom, 96 P.2d 302, 307
(Okla. 1939) (finding tortfeasor's possession and storage of explosives which were used in the
ordinary course of business could be incidental to and in furtherance of employment); cf. Hill,
230 P.2d at 486.
10. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1243.
11. Id. at 1245 (citing Vaughn, 40 P.2d at 1094; Cargo, 21 P.2d at 7).
[Vol. 30:375
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INTENTIONAL TORTS OF EMPLOYEES
Otherwise, the court's current analysis will ultimately hold employers
strictly liable for an employee's intentionally tortious act.12 Accord-
ingly, Rodebush should be reconsidered and reversed unless the em-
ployee's tortious conduct could have been reasonably foreseen by the
employer within the nature of the occupation.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Glenn Rodebush was an elderly Alzheimer's patient who lived at
New Horizon Nursing Home.'3 Due to the effects of his disease,
Rodebush was known to be occasionally combative.' 4 While giving
Rodebush his morning bath, a male nurse's aide delivered several
blows across Rodebush's face.'5 As a result, Rodebush's face soon
grew red and swollen with large welts. 6 When questioned about
Rodebush's appearance, the aide excused the blemishes as a "rash."' 7
Notwithstanding the aide's excuse, Rodebush's wife, who arrived
later, sought a medical determination of the cause of the red marks.' 8
A physician determined that the blemishes were delivered by
force of hand. The aide caring for Rodebush was in fact a former
felon convicted of assault and battery with intent to kill. Unfortu-
nately for Mr. Rodebush, the aide had "partied" all night and took a
break only to come to work.19 Adding to the misfortune, the staff
supervisor, who oversaw and monitored the work of the aides, arrived
at work over thirty minutes late.20 Otherwise, the nurse's aide, who
smelled of liquor, probably would not have tended to Mr. Rodebush. 2'
Ultimately, Mrs. Rodebush filed suit, basing her theory of recovery on
the doctrine of respondeat superior, and successfully held the nursing
home liable for the aide's intentional battery upon Mr. Rodebush.22
12. Although respondeat superior should be determined on a case by case basis, see Empire
Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fields, 73 P.2d 164,167 (Okla. 1937), there appears to be no limit on employer
liability. Based on the liberal interpretation of case law in the Rodebush analysis, the doctrine is
becoming a "catch-all" indemnification fund.




17. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1243.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1244.
20. Id. at 1243.
21. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1244. The aide was promptly sent home after the supervisor
smelled liquor on him. Id.
22. Id. at 1243, 1252.
19941
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B. The Rodebush Decision
Rodebush arrived at the Oklahoma Supreme Court after certio-
rari was granted from the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, which had
affirmed a district court decision holding the defendant vicariously lia-
ble for the aide's intentionally tortious conduct.
On appeal, the nursing home conceded that the nurse's aide had
acted as alleged.23 The defendant only disputed whether the aide's
tortious actions were actually within the scope of employment.24 Tak-
ing a fairly common sense approach, the defendant claimed that the
aide was acting of his own volition when he struck Rodebush and,
therefore, his actions were beyond the scope of employment. 2  Fur-
ther, since it was an intentional tort, the employer had no way to an-
ticipate that the attack would occur. The defendant simply had no
reason to suspect the aide would slap Rodebush. Since tortious be-
havior was strictly against any policy or training26 the aide received
from the nursing home, the defendant argued that it should not be
liable for the employee's tortious conduct.2 7
The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted that the nursing home
was liable because the aide was acting only "to further the business...
assigned to him by the employer."2" Therefore, upon striking
Rodebush, the aide was fulfilling his employment capacity-although
in a tortious manner. The plaintiff emphasized the location (upon the
defendant's premises) and timing (in the regular course of the defend-
ant's business) of the incident.29 The time and place of the incident,
according to the plaintiff, evidenced that the aide was acting for the
nursing home's gain and performing a task assigned by his employer.30
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision,
which the Court of Appeals had also upheld, finding the nursing home
23. Id. at 1245.
24. Id.
25. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1245.
26. Although it was not determinative, there was some dispute as to the extent of actual
training the aide received. No record existed which showed conclusively that the aide had been
given training. However, the aide's supervisor "was positive" that the aide received training,
since all aides received the same type and degree of training before they were fully employed.
Id. at 1244.
Thus, the defendant relied on its procedurally consistent, disciplined approach in training all
of its nursing aides. However, this argument was undermined by the bizarre facts of the case,
which weakened the nursing home's credibility. Undoubtedly, the jury's perception of possibly
improper training procedures and regulations influenced the large punitive damages award.
27. Id. at 1245.
28. Id.
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liable on the respondeat superior claim, while awarding the plaintiff
$50,000 in actual damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages.31 The
court specifically found the actions of the nurse's aide well within the
scope of employment and justified the punitive damages based on the
willful and wanton nature of the tortious conduct.3" In finding a suffi-
cient nexus for its respondeat superior analysis, the court relied on
Mistletoe Express Service v. Culp33 and Russell-Locke Super Service,
Inc. v. Vaughn.34
In Culp, the court considered whether a freight carrier was liable
for an assault by its agent on a customer. The agent was returning a
television to a customer who had filed a claim because the product
was damaged.35 The carrier's management "was expecting bad feel-
ings about its return of the tube; and ... knowing this deliberately
sent" an agent who was known as "Slugger" because of his fighting
skills.3 6 The agent was not only a handy pugilist, he also had a reputa-
tion for being "quarrelsome, hot-tempered and antagonistic." 37
In light of these facts, the court found that the carrier intention-
ally sent Slugger into circumstances that were "almost certain to trig-
ger his [Slugger's] temper and cause the very kind of result" which
occurred.3" Thus, there was a direct nexus between the employer's
action and the employee's assault. The assault was a means of carry-
ing out the job assigned by the employer to the employee; therefore,
the assault was within the scope of employment.39
An analogous fact pattern arose in the Vaughn decision. The de-
fendant, the manager of a company which sold and serviced automo-
bile storage batteries, believed that the plaintiff had taken a battery
without paying for it.40 Consequently, the employer ordered an em-
ployee to either repossess the battery or to exact full payment from
the plaintiff.41 With those orders, the employee arrived at the plain-
tiff's place of business and immediately began removing the battery
31. Id. at 1244-45.
32. Id. at 1246, 1252.
33. Rodebush, 867 P.2d at 1245 (citing Culp, 353 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1959)).
34. Id. at 1246 (citing Vaughn, 40 P.2d 1090 (Okla. 1935)).
35. Culp, 353 P.2d at 14.
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Russell-Locke Super Serv., Inc. v. Vauglm, 40 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Okla. 1935).
41. Id. at 1091.
1994]
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from the plaintiff's car.42 When the plaintiff resisted the employee's
efforts, a fight ensued.
Although the employee was successful in repossessing the bat-
tery, he soon returned it because the defendant "did not know
whether it was their battery or not."43 In finding the employee's ac-
tions well within the scope of employment, the court stated that it was
"unable to conceive of a case in which a servant could be more com-
pletely engaged in the carrying out of the master's instructions." 44
In Rodebush, the court mystifyingly likened the aide's attack on
Mr. Rodebush to the assaults which occurred in Culp and Vaughn.
Thus, from its base of precedent, the court leaped to its conclusion in
Rodebush. By so doing, it stretched the rule of vicarious liability to
more closely resemble strict liability.
III. THE DoCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
A. Early Beginnings and Justifications
From a purely theoretical standpoint, the doctrine of respondeat
superior appears to be quite simple:45
1) employee Xperforms an act for or at the behest of employer Y;
2) X, in acting for Y and in the line of employment, accidentally
injures Z;
3) therefore, the law charges Y with the damages or liabilities of Z
which were caused by X.46
Put more plainly, the law holds the employer responsible for an em-
ployee's act which accidentally harms a third party.47
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1091-92.
44. Id. at 1094.
45. Nevertheless, Justice Holmes found that "common sense is opposed to making one man
pay for another man's wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. Rlv. 1, 14 (1891).
46. See KFETON et al., supra note 1, § 69.
47. Brill, supra note 4, at 1 (explaining that "[t]he employer's liability is merely substituted
for the servant's, whose wrongful act caused the injury, and it is not dependent in any way upon
the fault of the master").
[Vol. 30:375
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss2/4
1994] INTENTIONAL TORTS OF EMPLOYEES
Respondeat superior was originally rooted in primitive supersti-
tion.48 In its infancy, the doctrine held the "master '49 of the house-
hold liable for the intentionally or negligently tortious acts of his wife,
servants, slaves, animals, or children. 0 As the doctrine evolved in the
early common law, it was justified on a theory of control or represen-
tation.-" The control or representation theory was a legal fiction
which held the employer liable for the employee's tortious conduct
based on the employer's "authority" over the employee. 2 This ap-
proach is best explained by Lord Brougham: "'[B]y employing him, I
set the whole thing in motion, and what he does, being done for my
benefit, and under my direction, I am responsible for the conse-
quences of doing it."' 3 Beyond control and representation, respon-
deat superior soon became rooted in another legal fiction known as
"implied command."54 The implied command approach rationalized
48. John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315,
317 (1894). But see Holmes, supra note 45, at 2 (asserting that the doctrine arose primarily from
Roman laws which held the master liable for the tortious acts of agents on public policy
grounds). Furthermore, Roman laws limited liability to innkeepers and shopowners. Wigmore,
7 HARv. L. REv., at 350; see also OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, THE COMMON LAW 15-16 (1881).
49. In the context of a patriarchal society, this term refers to the male head of the
household.
50. Wigmore, supra note 48, at 317; see also KEETON et al., supra note 1, § 69.
51. KEETON et al., supra note 1, § 69. Although there are several grounds upon which the
doctrine of respondeat superior has been established, no one theory is completely persuasive.
Nevertheless, when all of the approaches are considered together, the argument becomes greater
than the sum of its parts and it is quite compelling.
In justifying respondeat superior, Seavey observed:
[i]t is difficult to believe, however, that a principle opposed to common sense should
have existed so long and still be so vigorous.... [I]t may be noted that basic concepts
are the most difficult to express, and that lack of power of expression often leads to
specious reasons for sound results. The fact that the supposed victims of the rule, the
employing class, usually powerful and vocal in the protection of their interests, have not
been militant in demanding a change, and that the rule is constantly expanding without
meeting substantial opposition during a time of searching analysis and self-revelation, is
some evidence that it does not greatly depart from the common feeling of justice which
it is the primary function of the law to satisfy.
SEAVEY, supra note 5, at 130-31.
52. It is clear that no person may order or authorize tortious conduct against another, re-
gardless of employment status. See Hill v. McQueen, 230 P.2d 483, 485 (Okla. 1951) (quoting
Dixon v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 79 P. 943, 944 (Wash. 1905)). However, the control rationale is
persuasive if one accepts the premise that the person who is best able to exercise authority over
the situation should do so.
53. Brill, supra note 4, at 2 (citing Duncan v. Finlater, Cl. & F. 894, 910 (1839)). However,
the doctrine is not without its critics. Justice Holmes, for example, questioned the logic of the
respondeat superior analysis. See Holmes, supra note 45, at 7.
54. Blackstone best exemplified this perspective when he stated that "'[tihe master is an-
swerable for the act of his servant if done by his command either expressly given or implied."'
vARREN A. SEAVEY, Explanatory Notes to the Restatement of Agency - Tentative Draft No. 5, in
STuDIEs IN AGENCY 220, 250 (1949) (quoting 1 WILUAM BL cKs-roNE, COMMENTARIES 429
(1827)).
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employer liability on the concept that the employer had impliedly au-
thorized or commanded the tortious conduct through his agent.5
Thus, vicarious liability evolved from the employer's control over the
employee to the employer's approval of the employee's tortious ac-
tions. Clearly, judges were searching for some rationale for holding
an individual responsible for tortious acts he did not cause or commit.
Not surprisingly, the modem version of respondeat superior has
moved away from the control and implied command justifications56 to
what may be viewed as an allocation of risk doctrine. 7 Under this
approach, respondeat superior is justified because of the employer's
resources to indemnify the injured party and distribute the associated
loss to his customers as part of the cost of doing business.58 Thus, the
injured party is made whole, the employer is recompensed by the
community, and the employee avoids carrying the full financial bur-
den of liability.
Though it is true that an employer is more likely to be in a better
position to recoup his losses than an employee,5 9 there are additional
public policy considerations for placing the liability on the employer.
In the hiring process, for example, an employer is likely to be more
careful in determining who will act on his behalf, if he is ultimately
responsible for the employee's conduct.60 Similarly, in order to main-
tain a positive image, corporations will take extra precautions in their
policies dealing with the public.
55. Brill, supra note 4, at 2; see also KEEToN et al., supra note 1, § 70; Fruit v. Schreiner, 502
P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972).
56. Regardless of the designation, the law has consistently used the employer's power over
the employee as the ultimate justification for liability. As a result, a common complaint of the
logic underlying respondeat superior lies in the concept of "control." Taken to an extreme, the
employer will be compelled to dictate, or otherwise be responsible for, the employee's conduct
in all situations at all times.
57. Marc C. Carter, Getting to the Deep Pocket: An Analysis of Employer and Third Party
Liability Under Yellow Cab Co. v. Phillips, 17 T. MARsHALL L. RPv. 445,447 (1992) (reporting
that some authorities justify respondeat superior on the grounds that the business enterprise is in
a better position than the employee to guard against the risk of loss); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The
Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and
Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 563, 567 (1988) (arguing that societal loss, if borne
by the individual and not the employer or business, would skew the market for the employer,
because he would likely "expand production beyond the socially optimum level..
58. Carter, supra note 57, at 447.
59. Carter, supra note 57, at 447.
60. SEAVEy, supra note 5, at 148. Further, Seavey suggests that "[b]ecause of this financial
liability, it appears safe to assume that an employer can and does bring a pressure to bear upon
his employees which has a greater effect upon them than would the chance of their being made
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As a result, society receives several benefits by holding the em-
ployer liable for the employee's tortious act. Ultimately, however, the
justification for employer liability is best expressed by the observation
that "[i]n hard fact, the reason for employers' liability is the damages
are taken from a deep pocket.",61
B. Intentional Torts by Employees
Under the early common law, prior to the development of legal
fictions involving control and implied command, employers were not
held liable for their employees' intentional torts.62 The case of Wright
v. Wilcox63 firmly established that employers were not liable for will-
ful or malicious acts by their employees against third parties.64
In Wright, an ice wagon driver stirred his horses into a trot upon
seeing a boy trying to climb onto his wagon. Unfortunately, the boy
was thrown underneath the wagon and crushed. 5 The court noted the
intentional nature of the act, and held that unless the employer specif-
ically directed the act to be done or knowingly approved the act, he
could not be held liable. 6 Thus, the wagon driver's employer was ex-
culpated.67 Therefore, early American law held the employer liable
only where the employee negligently injured a third party.68
The early common law approach of separating negligent and in-
tentional behavior has, however, long been supplanted by the modem
alternative which asks only whether the employee was acting within
the "scope of employment" when he committed the tort.69 The
growth of the scope of employment analysis is, in large measure, sup-
ported by the public policy justification for the risk allocation doc-
trine.70 As the theory of respondeat superior developed within our
61. THOMAS BATY, VicARIous LIABiLTY 154 (1916).
62. SEAVEY, supra note 5, at 250-51; see also 2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF Aomcy § 1926 (2d ed. 1914).
63. 19 Wend. 343,345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). The Wright opinion cited M'Manus v. Crickett,
1 East 106, 102 Eng. Rep. 43 (1800), where the court held an employee liable for intentionally
driving his employer's chariot into the plaintiff's chaise. Due to the willful nature of the em-
ployee's action, the court did not hold the employer liable. Seavey describes Wright as the
"leading American case." SEAVEY, supra note 5, at 251.
64. Wright, 19 Wend. at 345, 347-48.
65. Id. at 343-44.
66. Id. at 345, 347.
67. Id. at 345-46.
68. Id. at 346.
69. See Miller-Brent Lumber v. Stewart, 51 So. 943, 944 (Ala. 1909); Alsever v. Minneapolis
& St. L. R.R. Co., 88 N.W. 841, 843 (Iowa 1902); King v. Magaw, 150 N.E.2d 91, 93 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1957); Korner v. Cosgrove, 141 N.E. 267, 268 (Ohio 1923).
70. See Sykes, supra note 57, at 565.
1994]
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expanding commercial and industrial society, the justifications of
agency and representation principles were incorporated, tested, and
expanded. As a result, the employer's responsibility for the em-
ployee's intentional torts became widely accepted, as long as the em-
ployee was acting within the scope of the employer's business. 71
C. Scope of Employment
Determining the scope of employment is the key to establishing
an employer's liability for an employee's acts. However, defining or
quantifying the "scope of employment" is no easy task.72 The term is
patently ambiguous. The Restatement (Second) of Agency, for exam-
ple, has several guidelines for determining when conduct is73 or is
not74 within the scope of employment. However, this formulation has
71. See 3 THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. AVERY HAGGARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT §§ 392, 393 (4th ed.
1932); KEETON et al., supra note 1, §§ 69-70; SEAVEY, supra note 5, at 245.
In fact, the "scope of employment" was soon legislatively approved. Louisiana, for exam-
ple, codified that employers must accept responsibility for their employees' intentional torts oc-
curring within the scope of employment. Chaney v. Frigidaire Corp., 31 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir.
1929).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 cmt. a (1958), suggests that the phrase
"means the extent of this subject matter and denotes the field of action within which one is a
servant."
73.
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not
unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) (emphasis added).
Section 228(1)(d) is especially relevant to the Rodebush decision. Is it reasonable for the
employer of a nursing home to expect an employee to use the level of force that rises to a
tortious battery? Nursing care for the elderly is not an inherently dangerous occupation in which
violence or danger are reasonably foreseeable within the scope of employment. The use of force
could not have been expected by the nursing home.
In addition, the aide was not employed for the purpose of physically or forcefully handling
elderly patients. He was hired to care for them. It is also questionable whether the aide's con-
duct was "actuated" toward serving his employer's benefit. If so, the aide's purpose was cer-
tainly not to benefit the nursing home. It seems more likely that the aide showed up at work
only to prevent being fired.
74. "Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind
from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a
purpose to serve the master." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958) (emphasis
added).
Based on the analysis in note 73 supra, the aide's actions were quite arguably encompassed
by Section 2 of the Restatement.
10
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not been accepted without criticism or without problems in its
application.7'
Beyond the Restatement approach, several prominent scholars-
define the scope of employment as an employee's action, regardless of
how improper, done for the purpose of furthering the employer's busi-
ness.76 There is another view which holds an employee within the
scope of employment when his actions are reasonably deemed to be a
"natural, direct and logical result" of his employment.77 These ap-
proaches, however, have not been widely accepted. Therefore, seek-
ing consistency and stability in their analysis, several courts treat the
question of when an act is "within the scope" as one of fact78 and
allow the jury to decide.79
D. Oklahoma Application of Respondeat Superior for Intentional
Torts
The seminal Oklahoma case regarding employer liability for an
employee's intentionally tortious conduct is Ada-Konawa Bridge Co.
v. Cargo.80 In Cargo, a bridge company employee allowed his son to
collect toll fares from travellers.8 ' When the plaintiff failed to pay the
fare and proceeded across the bridge, the employee's son retrieved a
gun and fired, wounding the plaintiff's elbow.82 The plaintiff success-
fully sued the bridge company on the grounds of vicarious liability.83
75. See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Alaska 1990) (noting the
difficulty of defining the scope of employment, even using the Restatement formulation, and
suggesting other factors which should also be considered).
76. KEETON et al., supra note 1, § 70. Although this approach rephrases the issue, defining
exactly what is in furtherance of the employer's business is a slippery proposition. What if an
individual is incidentally furthering the purpose of the employer, but that is not his primary
purpose? How broadly should the employer's purpose be construed? If this analysis requires
delving into the employee's motives, then it may be more problematic than the scope of employ-
ment test. Further, at what point does his motive supersede the action he was pursuing for his
employer? See COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra note 71, § 393.
77. 2 MECHEM, supra note 62, § 1875. This standard assumes employer liability where vio-
lence or tortious conduct inheres in the employment. Accordingly, under this standard,
Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., probably would not have been held liable for the aide's battery,
because nursing care for the elderly is not an inherently violent occupation.
78. See Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (observing that no categorical
statement can encompass the meaning of "scope of employment" which will be determined pri-
marily on findings of fact in each case); Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fields, 73 P.2d 164, 167 (Okla.
1937) (noting that the scope of employment is a question for determination by the jury).
79. See Empire Oil, 73 P.2d at 167.
80. 21 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1932).
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 8.
11
Winter: Rodebush: Finding the Road to Strict Liability for the Intentiona
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
The court surveyed and considered how other jurisdictions de-
fined and quantified the scope of employment. In its discussion, one
pivotal phrase repeatedly surfaced and influenced the development of
Oklahoma's vicarious liability doctrine. As a result, the court specifi-
pally defined the scope of employment to include the employee's con-
duct if the "acts are incidental to and in furtherance of" 4 the business
of the employer. To this day, the court has consistently followed this
language and perspective.8'
IV. Ti EFFEcr OF RODEBUSH ON OKLAHOMA'S RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR Docrmau
To properly analyze Rodebush, one must closely examine the na-
ture of the employment at issue. In its analysis, the court did not ad-
dress this determinative factor. As a result, the court clearly failed to
distinguish between risk-related and risk-averse employment activi-
ties. The former inherently involve conflict and are more likely to
involve tortious conduct than risk-averse occupations which are un-
likely to involve conflict or tortious conduct. The nature of the occu-
pation should be considered when determining employer liability for
those activities within the full scope of employment. Since determin-
ing the scope of employment is a fact-based inquiry, it is absurd to
measure an employee's actions without considering the context within
which they are performed.
Like the employee's actions, the employer's ability to foresee the
employee's tortious conduct should also be weighed. An employer
should only be liable for those actions he should reasonably expect to
occur within the job performance.
Unfortunately for employers, by failing to properly consider the
nature of the employment issue and the employer's ability to foresee
84. Id. at 7.
85. See Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Okla. 1993);
Haco Drilling Co. v. Burchette, 364 P.2d 674,677 (Okla. 1961); Roring v. Hoggard, 326 P.2d 812,
814 (Okla. 1958); Brayton v. Carter, 163 P.2d 960,962 (Okla. 1945); Patsy Oil & Gas v. Odom, 96
P.2d 302, 307 (Okla. 1939). The court's acknowledged standard holds an employee's act within
the scope of employment if:
(1) it be something fairly and naturally incident to the business, and if (2) it be done
while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be done, although mis-
takenly or ill advisedly, with a view to further the master's interest, or from some im-
pulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was incident to the attempt to perform
the master's business, and did not arise wholly from some external, independent, and
personal motive on the part of the servant to do the act upon his own account.
Cargo, 21 P.2d at 7 (citing 2 MECHEM, supra note 62, § 1960).
[Vol. 30:375
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the tortious conduct, the Rodebush analysis propels Oklahoma law
closer to strict liability for an employee's intentional torts.
A. The Nature of Employment at Issue
On one hand, an employer generally is liable for an employee's
intentionally tortious conduct committed against a third party within
the scope of employment.8 6 On the other hand, an employer gener-
ally is not liable for an employee's tortious conduct which is purely
personal and unrelated to the employment activitiesY One factor
which often arises when courts apply these rules is the type of employ-
ment at issue and if it is likely to require the employee to use force.88
Traditionally, the use of force is contemplated where the em-
ployee is hired to protect property or persons from theft or abuse.8 9
Consider, for example, an employee who recovers items possessed by
another.90 An attempt to retake the property may cause a conflict
between the possessor and the repossessor. 91 In fact, the employee
may need to resort to physical violence in order to protect himself.
Accordingly, even if the employee is instructed not to use force,
the possibility that he must certainly exists, if only for self-defense
86. Cargo, 21 P.2d at 7.
87. western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 67 F.2d 487, 488 (5th Cir. 1933). This is, of course,
tempered by the problematic issue of the scope of employment and results in a question of fact.
88. COOLEY & HAGGARD, supra note 71, § 393 (discussing an employer's liability in rela-
tion to the nature of the employment); SEAvEY, supra note 5, at 245 (noting several cases which
hold the employer liable for an employee's unprivileged use of force in accomplishing the em-
ployer's purpose if the employee is regularly required to use force).
89. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 cmt. a (1958) notes:
These [situations] occur when the servant: (a) acts in the protection of or recaption of
his master's property, or (b) in excess of zeal in competition, or (c) engages in a fight
arising out of a dispute connected with his work for his employer. In all of these situa-
tions the liability of the principal depends fundamentally upon the likelihood of a bat-
tery or other tort in view of the kind of result to be accomplished, the customs of the
enterprise and the nature of the persons normally employed for doing the work.
90. "[O]ne who is sent to recapture property is likely to come into contact with a possessor
unwilling to surrender it, and persons sent to recapture goods are frequently of the kind who
would be not unlikely to attempt force" if it should appear in the least bit necessary. Id.
Based on this view of the "likely tortfeasor," is a nurse's aide in a home for the elderly
typically "not unlikely to attempt force?" Surely the occupational natures of a nurse's aide and a
repossession artist could not be more different.
91. Brill, supra note 4, at 6. "An employee sent to recapture chattels may frequently have
to overcome resistance from the buyer [or possessor] of the article being repossessed." Id Thus,
the resistance of the possessor, added to the character of the repossessor, equates in a likely use
of force, and possibly injury. Tortious contact is, at least, foreseeable.
1994]
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purposes.92 Therefore, due to the nature of the occupation, it is ar-
guably within the scope of employment, and reasonably foreseeable to
the employer, that the employee may have to physically defend or
protect himself. Such an employment obligation could result in the
commission of tortious violence against another while specifically act-
ing for the employer.
There are similar examples concerning other professions or occu-
pations. Consider, for instance, a bartender or "bouncer" at a bar or
tavern who must eject an intoxicated patron. Similarly, private secur-
ity is an occupation where tortious contact with third parties inheres in
the nature of the occupation. Where the violent conduct is inherent in
the job due to the nature of the work, the employer should be vicari-
ously liable for the employee's tortious acts. Where the nature and
expectations of the employment are weighed and considered, then
employer liability is more justifiably and persuasively rooted in public
policy. 93
When the nature of employment is discussed in the context of a
"bouncer" at a tavern or a security guard at a local mall, the em-
ployer's liability for the employee's intentional tortious violence is
reasonable and practical. The nature of the occupation demands it.
However, in the case of an aide at a nursing home, employer liability
is not reasonable.
92. See generally Novick v. Gouldsberry, 173 F.2d 496, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1949); Dilli v. John-
son, 107 F.2d 669, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1939); McChristian v. Popkin, 171 P.2d 85, 89 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1946); Johnson v. Monson, 190 P. 635 (Cal. 1920).
93. It would: 1) encourage and foster careful employee screening by the employer; 2) in-
crease the incentive for the employer to buy insurance in order to protect the injured party; and
3) allow the employer to pass the costs on to the consumer. Consider also the RESTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958), which states:
[t]he conception of the master's liability to third persons appears to be an outgrowth of
the idea that within the time of service, the master can exercise control over the physi-
cal activities of the servant. From this, the idea of responsibility for the harm done by
the servant's activities followed naturally.... [W]ith the growth of large enterprises, it
became increasingly apparent that it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain
from the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible for the mistakes,
the errors of judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction and for his
benefit.
See also Carter, supra note 57, at 447 (discussing the economic validity of the allocation of re-
sources, as well as the ability and likelihood that an employer will obtain insurance); Sykes,
supra note 57, at 565-70 (analyzing the choice between a rule of personal liability for an em-




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss2/4
INTENTIONAL TORTS OF EMPLOYEES
The very nature of the nursing home industry, especially in the
context of the elderly, lies in taking care of others. 94 The basic em-
ployment activities are feeding, bathing, and caretaking for those un-
able to do so for themselves; it is highly unlikely that the use of violent
force would be required by an employee. It simply does not inhere in
the nature of the job.95 Therefore, to hold an employer liable for con-
duct he did not expect, or had no reason to foresee, is not only unrea-
sonable-it is unfair.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that in certain
types of employment, "[s]uccessful performance involve[s] immediate
action of some kind in opposition to the will of the other and there-
fore [should] be anticipated by the employer." 96 In these situations,
tortious contact is foreseeable because it inheres in the very nature of
the work. If, however, the employment does not require the use of
force because it is not confrontational in nature, then "[n]o such ac-
tion can properly be contemplated as an incident to the exercise of
ordinary authority .... And, in absence of some additional authority
contemplating extraordinary action, there exists no basis for holding
such extraordinary action to be within the scope of the servant's au-
thority."97 As a result, until Rodebush, Oklahoma law would not
characterize an employee's tortious act as within the scope of employ-
ment unless it was reasonably foreseeable to the employer.
Using this standard, a more reasonable interpretation of the
events in Rodebush is that the aide's tortious act was not done with
any intention to further the nursing home's business. The aide's ac-
tions were not taken to further his employer's financial gain. The bat-
tery was not directed or authorized by the employer and it certainly
did not inhere in the nature of the job. In short, the nurse's aide did
not batter Mr. Rodebush for any reason related to his job. It is more
94. Consider the occupational use of force as contemplated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 245 (1958): "A master is subject to liability for the intended tortious harm by a
servant to the person or things of another by an act done in connection with the servant's em-
ployment, although the act was unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable in view of the
duties of the servant."
This rule directly applies to Rodebush. At no time could the employer have expected the
aide's tortious conduct-it was too far removed from any normal or predictable employment
activity associated with his employment. It is ludicrous to equate caretaking for the elderly with
an occupation based on the use of force.
95. As Cooley eloquently observed, "[t]he test of the master's responsibility is not the mo-
tive of the servant, but whether that which he did was something his employment contemplated,
and something which, if he should do it lawfully, he might do in the employer's name." COOLEY
& HAGGARD, supra note 71, § 393.
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likely that the aide battered Mr. Rodebush because he was drunk,
tired, or frustrated.9 8 Therefore, the court should recognize that the
aide's act "was unlawful and wrong, [it] was not done in performance
of any duty imposed upon him by his employment, nor done within
the scope of his employment, nor in the furtherance of his principal's
business, and therefore the [employer] ... cannot be held responsible
for such act."9 9 While battering Mr. Rodebush, the aide's only con-
nection with his employer may have involved attributing blame for
Mr. Rodebush's facial marks on a rash. 0"
In the final analysis, the nature of the employment is a weighty
consideration that the court in Rodebush simply chose not to evalu-
ate.10' The court viewed the employee's actions without examining
the context in which they were performed. However, neither the em-
ployee nor the occupation exist in a vacuum. Further, the nature of
the job defines the reasonable parameters of employee conduct. From
this perspective, the defendant should not be liable for the aide's in-
dependent act. In the words of the court, "[m]aster[s] and employers
may be held to answer for damages occasioned by their servants in the
exercise of the functions in which they are employed. However, in
reason, they cannot be held responsible generally for all wrongful con-
duct of which they may be guilty outside of such functions.""' 2
98. Assuming the events occurred in this manner, an oft-quoted passage may be applicable:
"'If the servant, wholly for a purpose of his own, disregarding the object for which he is em-
ployed, and not intending by his act to execute it, does an injury to another not within the scope
of his employment, the master is not liable."' CooLEY & HAGGARD, supra note 71, § 393
(citing Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen (Mass.) 49, 57 (1925)). In this light, the court failed to
address the aide's conduct as his own.
99. Tulsa Gen. Drivers Union, Local No. 523 v. Conley, 288 P.2d 750, 754 (Okla. 1955).
100. Case law has clearly established that an employee will be solely responsible if he tor-
tiously injures a third party while acting overzealously for his employer. This is particularly true
where the employee's use of force is not necessary to the occupation. From this perspective, the
nurse's aide was drunk and tired. The aide did not act for his employer, but out of fear of
reprimand if he did not finish the job. In his efforts, the drunken aide went too far in personally
discharging his duties until he went beyond the scope of employment. But see Brill, supra note 4,
at 8-9 (citing MJ. Uline Co. v. Cadshaw, 171 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Frances v. Barbazon, 134
So. 789 (La. 1931)).
101. It is surprising that the court would avoid this issue. Seavey, for instance, suggests that
the nature of the employment should be a significant consideration in determining employer
liability. SEAVEY, supra note 5, at 260 (noting the value of force involved in the job when seek-
ing to place liability on the employer). Similarly, Brill observes that the court's ability to place
liability on the employer where the employment does not involve force is highly suspect and
usually stretches the traditional doctrine. Brill, supra note 4, at 7-9.
102. Conley, 288 P.2d at 754.
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B. The Employer's Ability to Foresee the Employee's Tortious
Conduct
"[N]o defendant should ever be held liable for consequences
which no reasonable person would expect to follow from the con-
duct." 103 Consequently, liability should be limited to the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of an individual's actions, so that he is not
strictly liable for accidents causally unrelated to his behavior."°
Therefore, the question to ascertain is whether the employee's inten-
tional battery was reasonably foreseeable by the employer in view of
the aide's employment duties.105 The issue should be viewed from the
perspective of an average reasonable person.0 6
If the nursing home could not have reasonably foreseen the aide's
intentional battery on Mr. Rodebush, then it should not be vicariously
liable for his conduct. By measuring the employer's liability with a
reasonableness test, liability is restricted to some fairly measurable
criteria. 0 7 As a probable result, the reasonableness standard would
provide employers with advance warning of the type of behavior
which will not be tolerated. 08
Although reasonableness may not always be simply discerned,
the test would add some substance to clarifying which activities are
within the scope of employment. In essence, if an employer should
103. KEETrON et al., supra note 1, § 43. Although the quotation herein measures the limita-
tion of liability of risk for an individual's negligence, it applies equally well in the context of the
employer's ability to foresee the employee's conduct.
104. The test is determined by the foreseeable consequences and liability is restricted to
those consequences. An interesting view is found in the oft-quoted explanation by Judge
Griffith:
[t]he area within which liability is imposed is that which is within the circle of reason-
able foreseeability, using the original point at which the negligent act was committed or
became operative, and thence looking in every direction as the semi-diameters of the
circle; and those injuries which from this point could or should have been reasonably
foreseen, as something likely to happen, are within the field of liability, while those
which, although foreseeable, were foreseeable only as remote possibilities, those only
slightly probable, are beyond and not within the circle-in all of which time, place and
circumstance play their respective and important parts.
KEETON et al., supra note 1, § 43. As the passage indicates, the reasonable person standard is
limited to conduct and consequences which are reasonably foreseeable.
105. See KErorN et al., supra note 1, § 43.
106. Note that this discussion does not address the issue of negligent hiring. For an enlight-
ening work discussing the growing acceptance of the tort of negligent hiring, see Michael F.
Wais, Note, Negligent Hiring-Holding Employers Liable When Their Employees' Intentional
Torts Occur Outside the Scope of Employment, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 237 (1990) (discussing the
employer's duty to use reasonable care in investigating a prospective employee's background as
the proximate cause of the third party's injury).
107. See KEETON et al., supra note 1, § 43.
10S. The reasonableness standard is a familiar concept at common law, and could easily be
adapted to each case, because of the fact-specific nature of the respondeat superior doctrine.
1994]
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have reasonably foreseen an employee's tortious acts within his occu-
pational role, that conduct is likely to fall within the scope of employ-
ment. A reasonableness standard would also allow the jury to more
clearly weigh the employee's duties, the nature of the employment,
and the expectations of the parties.
In many cases, custom or trade usage could also be considered.
This would provide a standard which is more particularized to the in-
dustry in question. By weighing all the factors, rather than just a facial
glance at the time and scope of the employee's tortious conduct, the
court would strike a more equitable balance for all parties.
If, however, the court continues along the analytical path estab-
lished in Rodebush, then Oklahoma approaches an almost limitless
liability upon employers for their employee's intentional torts.10 9 The
scope of employment, in measuring the intentional torts of the em-
ployee, grows wider and broader until the employer is engulfed in in-
suring its employees' actions-regardless of how unreasonable those
actions may be. Ultimately, the employer simply becomes the insurer
of the employee and faces liability without fault.
Although there are several economic principles and arguments 10
that suggest liability is best borne by the employer, the employer is
not always able to pass on the costs to the public. Furthermore, pass-
ing along the cost is a questionable policy from a consumer-oriented
perspective. It is not a bargain if consumers do not gain safety from
the extra costs. In reality, consumers would gain only some assurance
that they will have a third party to collect from in case of injury. As a
predictable result, this perspective fosters an increase in lawsuits, not
safety.
By forcing the employer to insure against an employee's unfore-
seeable, intentionally tortious conduct, Oklahoma threatens those in-
dustries which deal with the public. The Rodebush analysis is
problematic, because the employer had no reasonable expectation
that the employee would tortiously injure Mr. Rodebush, especially
given the nature of the occupation. The chilling effect on all business,
109. The rather cavalier tone of the opinion and the court's failure to address issues critical
to the defendant's case do not bode well for employers. The chilling effect on enterprising em-
ployers and businesses was, apparently, discounted by the court.
110. These arguments are expounded by several authors who generally use some method of
an allocation of the risk formulation. See generally Carter, supra note 57 (asserting that it is
conducive to an industrial society to hold an enterprise liable for the torts of its employees);
Sykes, supra note 57 (stating that the allocation of risk, although it may not serve the market
most efficiently, serves the market more efficiently than placing liability on the employee).
[Vol. 30:375
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and nursing homes in particular, is unavoidable. Nevertheless, in
Oklahoma, Rodebush's reasoning would hold the employer liable.
A nursing home is especially problematic. There is no question
that the aging "baby-boomer generation" is now reaching middle age
and will eventually join the ranks of the elderly. The social policies
now in place for dealing with the elderly will have resounding ramifi-
cations in the future. To that end, this case sets unfortunate prece-
dent. A chilling effect that freezes the expansion of enterprise and
employment in a field like nursing home care would be extremely un-
fortunate. From the aspect of public policy, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, by extending employer liability beyond any reasonable mea-
sure, has chosen short term gain for one injured party instead of long-
term, lasting benefits for all.
V. CONCLUSION
In Rodebush, the Oklahoma Supreme Court moved from liability
based on the probable foreseeability of an employee's actions, to lia-
bility based primarily on the time and place of the incident. As a re-
sult, Oklahoma's vicarious liability more closely resembles strict
liability. As precedent, Rodebush simply failed to advance a plausible
analysis which considers either the employer's reasonably foreseeable
expectations or the nature of the employment at issue. As a result,
the court measures the employee's act in a context completely unre-
lated to his employment. Further, the court places liability on an em-
ployer for the uncontrollable and unforeseeable actions of an
employee.
Therefore, when examining an employee's intentional torts, the
court should determine whether the employee's intentional conduct
was reasonably foreseeable by the employer within the nature of the
employment. This is especially critical for the fact-specific inquiry of
the respondeat superior doctrine. Otherwise, the court's current anal-
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